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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to understand the functional role of mental representations and
intentionality in skilled actions from a systems related perspective. Therefore, we will
evaluate the function of representation and then discuss the cognitive architecture of
skilled actions in more depth. We are going to describe the building blocks and levels
of the action system that enable us to control movements such as striking the tennis ball
at the right time, or grasping tools in manual action. Based on this theoretical under-
standing the measurement of mental representations and related research results
concerning mental representation in skilled action are presented in an overview. This
leads to the question how mental representations develop and change during learning.
Finally, to consolidate the functional understanding of mental representation in skilled
action and interaction, we provide examples how to use the measurement of mental
representation in humans to inform technical systems.
1 Representation of Motor Action
The representation and simulation of motor acts has a long and varied history in
psychology and movement science. Johann Friedrich Herbart related movements to
perceptual effects as early 1825 and proposed that the imagery of perceptual effects can
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elicit the related movements (p. 464). William James wrote some years later (1890, p.
526) “that every representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual
movement …” These and other approaches of an ideomotor understanding of human
action fell out of fashion in the era of behaviorism (for a review, see Shin et al. 2010).
However, around 100 years after James they became an important reference point for
many experimental approaches, for example, ideomotor action (e.g., Knuf et al. 2001;
Kunde 2001; Kunde et al. 2004; Koch et al. 2004), common coding (Prinz 1987, 1997),
anticipative behavioral control (Hoffmann 1993; Hoffmann et al. 2004, 2007), theory
of event coding (Hommel et al. 2001) and cognitive architecture of action approach
(Schack and Hackfort 2007; Schack and Mechsner 2006; Schack and Ritter 2009,
2013). These action driven approaches emphasize the goal-directedness of actions, the
importance of anticipated perceptual effects, and the crucial role of mental representa-
tions in action control, and thus share the idea that voluntary movements might be
planned, performed, and stored in memory by way of representations of anticipated
effects. Skillful coordination occurs if appropriate mental representations of the motor
task and action goals are stored in memory, because cognitive representations govern
the tuning of motor commands and muscular activity patterns. (for an overview of
action science approaches, see Herwig et al. 2013).
Some of the dynamical systems approaches try to explain biological movements
without alluding to cognitive levels (or internal models) while others explain cognition
from a non-representational point of view (e.g. Seifert et al. 2017). Bernstein (1947)
envisaged a complex architecture of human movement control ranging from “low”
levels corresponding to involuntary movements, up to “high” cognitive levels that can
be thought of as involving conceptual representations. The lowest level ist the level of
muscle tone, responsible for background tension oft the skeletal muscle system. The
second “lowest” level corresponds to synergistic processing, and this level has often
been referred to in dynamical systems approaches (e.g., Ijspeert et al. 2002; Wolpert
et al. 1995). We note that spinal (e.g., Poppele and Bosco 2003; D’Avella and Bizzi
1998) and some muscle synergies do not always require input from higher cognitive
levels (e.g., Debicki and Gribble 2005). Such aspects of involuntary movements are
often addressed in sensorimotor models of motor control (e.g., Todorov 2004; Kawato
1999). These processes run mostly automatically but can reach conscious levels if
attention is directed towards them. In stark contrast to “low” levels, our understanding
of cognitivemovement control is far less advanced. Therefore, in this chapter, we focus
on the cognitive dimensions and levels of human motor control (cognitive action
architecture approach), and suggest that action representations should be differentiated
from different types of action control (goal-oriented vs automated, cf. Schack 2004a,
Schack and Ritter 2009, Schack et al. 2014). From that perspective involuntary motor
control (e.g., reflexes and postural control) are also critically important as sensorimotor
loops. There are many opportunities of functional cooperation within the whole action
architecture (for an overview see: D'Avella et al. 2015, Table 1).
In such a context, Mylopoulus and Pacherie (Pacherie 2008; Mylopoulos and
Pacherie 2019) discussed different levels and types of intentions within their (DPM)
action model. From their perspective, action control is based on coordination between
different levels of intentions and activity: distal, proximal and motor intentions, with
distinctive roles in the guidance and control of actions. While distal intentions relate to
reasoning and have a propositional format, proximal intentions integrate conceptual
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content with perceptual and memory information about the situation and one‘s motor
repertoire. Motor representations, according to the DPM action model, with the
functional role of „bringing about the actions they represent “(Mylopoulos and Pacherie
2019, p. 4). While originating from a philosophical background, this approach links
well to the cognitive architecture of skilled action (Schack 2004a; Schack and Hackfort
2007), its idea of a hierarchical organization of motor action from mental to sensori-
motor levels, and the central role of mental representations for skilled action.
2 Cognitive Architecture of Skilled Action
Prior to the current perspectives on anticipatory motor control, Bernstein had already
pointed towards the large number of degrees of freedom in the human motor system,
the need for continuous processing of sensory feedback to control this highly redundant
system, and the importance of the anticipation of movement effects for movement
organization. Bernstein (1947) proposed a model of the construction of movements
according to which different organizational (and evolutionary) levels interact to gener-
ate and control different types of movement. These levels are thought to interact not
simply in a fixed hierarchical manner, but their mode of interaction and hierarchical
organization depends on the type of movement task and the level of expertise of the
person.
As we know from actions in everyday life or from skilled and complex action in
sports, certain aspects of our motor actions are automated and running without explicit
attention, while others are goal directed and anticipative. Automatization (without
explicit control) of actions occurs in the context of special stimuli (e.g., catching an
object if it is thrown close to our body). The idea that movement control is hierarchi-
cally organized has been approached from different perspectives. One perspective
focuses on a hierarchy of differing levels of representation (see, e.g. Jeannerod 2004;
Rosenbaum 1987), while another perspective focused more strongly on the aspect of a
hierarchical execution regulation (e.g. Keele et al. 1990; Marken 2002). The model
proposed next, views the functional construction of actions (Schack and Hackfort 2007;
Schack and Ritter 2009) on the basis of a reciprocal assignment of performance-
oriented regulation and representational levels (see Table 1). These levels differ
according to their central tasks on the regulation and representation levels. Each level
is assumed to be functionally autonomous.
Table 1 Levels of motor action (modified from Schack and Ritter 2009)
Code Level Main function Sub function Tools
IV Mental control Regulation Volitional initiation control
strategies
Symbols; strategies
III Mental representation Representation Effect-oriented adjustment Basic Action Concepts
II Sensorimotor
representation
Representation Spatial-temporal adjustment Perceptual representation
Internal models
I Sensorimotor control Regulation Automatization Motor primitives basic
reflexes
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Both control levels, the level of sensorimotor control (I) and the level of mental
control (IV), serve the main function of action control and regulation, whereas the level
of sensorimotor representation (II) and the level of mental representation (III) are
representational, and are closely connected to the two regulation levels. While the
regulation level of mental control (IV) is induced intentionally and is relevant for the
anticipation of action effects, the regulation level I is perceptually (externally) induced
and is controlled by recent environmental stimuli. The level of mental control is
responsible for volitional control while the level of sensorimotor control (I) is based
on movement primitives and responsible for automatization. If we imagine a sport task
like alpine skiing, it is easy to understand that particular elements of motor control are
automatized (level I) like rhythmical swing moves. However, they can also be con-
trolled voluntarily (level IV) in the case of difficult environmental circumstances or in
the case of re-learning. Relevant modality-specific (e.g., kinesthetical, visual) informa-
tion representing the effects of the particular movement is stored on the level of
sensorimotor representation (II). Mental representations of sensorial effects and move-
ment structures are located within the level of mental representation (III), and are based
on the conceptual building blocks of action (Basic Action Concepts, BACs) that will be
described in the following section.
3 Building Blocks of Action
It is a well-established idea in cognitive psychology and indeed it has received growing
acceptance in the fields of motor control and sport psychology that actions are mentally
represented in functional terms as a combination of the executed action and the
intended or observed effects (Jeannerod 2006; Koch et al. 2004; Knuf et al. 2001;
Hommel et al. 2001; Prinz 1997). The link between movements and perceptual
movement effects is bi-directional and is thought to be stored hierarchically in long-
term memory (LTM). Such movement representations are necessary because complex
movements are unlikely to rely solely on online calculation due to human resource
limitations. Rosenbaum and co-workers (Rosenbaum et al. 2007) demonstrated that
movements can be understood as a serial and functional order of goal-related body
postures, or goal postures, and their transitional states. That is, movements can be
understood as the changes between body postures. Whereas body postures (keyframes)
are represented in detail, the interframes (i.e., the movements between body postures)
contain only differences between two successive keyframes. The better the order
formation within cognitive movement representations, the more easily information
can be accessed and retrieved (Schack and Ritter 2009). This leads to increased motor
execution performance, which reduces the amount of attention required for successful
performance (Beilock et al. 2002; Land et al. 2014; Raab and Johnson 2007). The
nodes within such networks of movement representation contain functional subunits or
building blocks that relate motor actions and associated perceptual effects.
Researchers from different fields, such as cognitive psychology, cognitive robotics
and sport psychology (Maycock et al. 2010; Schack 2004a, b; Schack and Mechsner
2006; Schack and Ritter 2009; Tenenbaum et al. 2009), have provided evidence for so-
called basic action concepts (BACs) in the control of human movements. Analogous to
the well-established notion of basic object concepts (Rosch 1978), BACs are the mental
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counterparts of functional elementary components of complex movements. They can
be thought of as the cognitive chunking of body postures and movement events
concerning common functions in realizing action goals. BACs do not refer to
behavior-related invariant properties of objects, as in the case in basic object concepts,
but to perceptual invariant properties of movements. According to the cognitive action
architecture (CAA) approach (Schack 2004a, b, 2010; Schack and Hackfort 2007;
Schack and Ritter 2009), mental representations are thought to comprise such repre-
sentational units (i.e., BACs) and their structural composition in relation to one another.
Therefore, BACs relate to functional and perceptual dimensions of movements and
body postures and are clearly linked to sensory movement effects. In this respect,
BACs differ from perspectives that conceive motor programs as a prestructured set of
muscle-oriented commands and which assume that movements are initiated without
regard to sensory information (see Schmidt and Lee 1999).
4 Measurement of Mental Representation in Sport
A wide range of methods was used to study mental representations’ structures in long
term memory (for an overview see Hodges et al. 2007; McPherson and Kernodle
2003). One of the first studies in sports was reported by French and Thomas (1987).
They assessed various components of basketball performance (e.g., control of the
basketball and cognitive decisions, dribbling and shooting skills), along with declara-
tive knowledge in 8- to 12-year-old children. Declarative knowledge was measured
using a paper-and-pencil test. Additionally, specific sorting techniques and interview
methods have been used to confirm expertise-dependent differences in the classification
and representation of context-specific problem states in springboard divers, judokas,
triathletes, and weight lifters (Huber 1997; Russell 1990). Studies using categorization
tasks have shown that experts classify problems according to underlying functional
principles, whereas novices operate more strongly with superficial features (e.g. Allard
and Burnett 1985; Russell and Salmela 1992). Furthermore, questionnaire methods and
interviews have revealed the structure and organization of movement knowledge in, for
example, tennis (McPherson and Thomas 1989, McPherson and Kernodle 2003),
Volleyball (McPherson and Vickers 2004), and basketball (French and Thomas
1987). These methods facilitate the study of knowledge-based mental representations
of movements in LTM (for an overview, see Hodges et al. 2007; Schack 2012).
However, most of them focus on explicit knowledge and are non-experimental (e.g.,
interviews, questionnaires, paper-and-pencil tests). Therefore as an experimental meth-
od that avoids introspective statements, structural dimensional analysis of mental
representation (SDA-M) method has been introduced (Schack 2004a, 2012). This
method provides psychometric data on mental representations of complex movements
and as such permits investigating the status and change of structures of mental
movement representations.
In detail, the SDA-M (Schack 2012) maps mental representations as integrated
networks of basic action concepts (BACs) across both individuals and social groups,
by providing information on relational structures in a given set of concepts with respect
to goal-oriented actions. The internal grouping of conceptual units (i.e., the clustering
of BACs) delineates the structure of the knowledge representation of a certain
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movement. While mental representation structure refers to the relation and the grouping
of BACs in LTM, learning can be considered as the modification of the mental
representation structure over time.
The SDA-M consists of four steps (for details, see Schack 2012). First, a split
procedure involving a multiple sorting task (pair-wise comparisons) delivers a distance
scaling between BACs of a suitably predetermined set. Specifically, during this
procedure, one concept of a given set of basic action concepts is permanently displayed
on a computer screen (anchor concept) and all other concepts are compared to that
anchor concept successively. Participants have to decide whether the two given
concepts are related to each other during movement execution. The procedure con-
tinues, until all concepts have been compared to all other concepts. Second, a hierar-
chical cluster analysis is used to transform the set of BACs into a hierarchical structure.
Third, a factor analysis reveals the dimensions in this structured set of BACs, and
fourth, the cluster solutions are tested for invariance within or between groups.
As a result, one obtains the individual partitioning of the BACs in hierarchical tree-
like structures, the so-called dendrograms (see Fig. 1). Cluster solutions are calculated
for all individual participants and for groups. Each cluster solution is established by
determining a critical Euclidean distance dcrit (marked by the solid horizontal line in
Fig. 1). The critical value dcrit depends on the number of concepts. All junctures below
the value dcrit are considered related, while the junctures above this value are considered
unrelated. This results in a cluster solution. In an high level expert structure, the
resulting cluster solution represents mostly the functional phases of the movement.
A good example to investigate the mental representation structures of a complex
movement on different levels of expertise is the tennis serve (Schack and Mechsner
2006). For a tennis serve, many degrees of freedom have to be controlled in the
musculoskeletal system, and the movement execution depends considerably on training
Fig. 1 Dendrograms for the experts (a) and non-players (b) based on the hierarchical cluster analysis of BACs
in the tennis serve. The horizontally aligned numbers denote the BACs (for the code, see text), the vertical
numbers, the Euclidean distances. For every group, it holds n = 11; p = .05; dkrit = 3.46. A tennis serve consists
of three distinct phases, each of which fulfils distinct functional and biomechanical demands. First, in the pre-
activation phase, body and ball are brought into position, and tension energy is provided to prepare the strike.
The following BACs were identified: (1) ball throw, (2) forward movement of the pelvis, (3) bending the
knees, and (4) bending the elbow. Second, in the strike phase, energy is conveyed to the ball. The following
BACs were identified: (5) frontal upper body rotation, (6) racket acceleration, (7) whole body stretch motion,
and (8) hitting point. Third, in the final swing phase, the body is prevented from falling, and the racket
movement is decelerated after the strike. The following BACs were identified: (9) wrist flap, (10) forward
bending of the body, and (11) racket follow through. [Reprinted from Schack and Mechsner (2006), with
permission]
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and expertise. On the other hand it is a finite and recognizable action pattern of which
the overall structure is well defined by biomechanical demands.
Experts in that study (n = 11 male tennis players; mean age, 24 ± 3.7 years) from the
upper German leagues were ranked between 15th and 500th in the German men’s
rankings, while the non-players (n = 11 males; mean age, 24 ± 6.7 years) had no tennis
experience (maximum 5 h) and had never had any tennis lessons.
The single BACs and the adequate functional organization of the tennis serve were
characterized in advance in collaboration with non-players, athletes with different
levels of expertise, and coaches (as a combination of interviews and task analysis).
Photographs of the evaluated tennis sub-movements were presented to experts and non-
players together with linguistic markers of varying generality. The picture-word com-
bination the appropriateness of which took the shortest time to judge was chosen, in
analogy to classical methods (Rosch 1978).
Each BAC was characterized by a set of closely interconnected sensory and
functional features. For example, BAC 7 (whole body stretch motion) is functionally
related to providing energy to the ball, transforming tension into swing, stretching but
remaining stable. Afferent sensory features of the corresponding sub-movement that
allow monitoring of the initial conditions are bent knees, tilted shoulder axis, and body
weight on the left foot. Re-afferent sensory features that allow monitoring of whether
the functional demands of the sub-movements have been addressed successfully are
muscles stretched and under tension, proprioceptive and, finally, visual perception of
the swinging arm and ball in view.
Figure 1a depicts the group dendrogram for the experts. Their cognitive structure
was very similar to an optimal cluster solution, matching the functional and biome-
chanical demands of the tennis serve. The three functional phases (i.e., pre-activation,
strike, and final swing) form clearly separated clusters in the dendrogram. An invari-
ance analysis (step four of the SDA-M) confirmed this interpretation. There was no
significant difference between the cognitive BAC framework in experts and the
biomechanical demand structure of the movement (presented as a hierarchical subtask
structure). In contrast, the clustering of the BACs in the dendrogram of the non-players
(Fig. 1b) did not mirror the functionally and biomechanically demanding phases so
well. The BACs were less clearly grouped, with no close neighborhoods, and the partial
clusters largely failed to reach significance. Moreover, the average novice structure
differed significantly from the optimal cluster solution. In sum, in experts, these
representational frameworks were organized in a distinctive hierarchical tree-like
structure, were remarkably similar between individuals, and were well-matched with
the functional and biomechanical demands of the task. In contrast, action representa-
tions in low-level players and novices were organized less hierarchically, were more
variable among persons, and were less well-matched with functional and biomechan-
ical demands.
More generally, if two BACs are frequently classified by participants as being
“functionally related” during the split procedure, these BACs are characterized by a
small Euclidean distance which is reflected in a low projection of the BACs on the
vertical axis in the dendrogram (e.g., BACs 1 & 2 in Fig. 1a). If two BACs are not
judged to be “functionally related,” the Euclidean distance is larger (a bigger number on
the y-axis) and the projection of the two BACs is high in the tree diagram (e.g., BACs 9
& 10 in Fig. 1a).
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In order to measure the inter-individual or inter-group differences between repre-
sentation structures, a structural invariance measure λ is determined based on (1) the
number of constructed clusters of the pair-wise cluster solutions, (2) the number of
concepts within the constructed clusters and (3) the average quantities of the construct-
ed clusters. The invariance measure λ ranges from 0 (no similarity at all) to 1 (tree
diagrams are identical). Two cluster solutions (or representation structures) are consid-
ered to be invariant (i.e., the same) if λ > λcrit = .68 (which corresponds to a significance
level of α = .05; for more detailed information, see Schack 2010, 2012).
Furthermore, as shown in a volleyball study (Schack 2004b), these mental repre-
sentation structures are position- and task-dependent. Such representation structures are
the outcome of an increasing, effort-reducing formation of order in LTM (see Figs. 1, 2
and 3). BACs are more and more embedded in a tree-like structure, with branches
evolving from BACs which are functionally related to each other, representing func-
tional movement problems such as „generating energy “or „transforming tension into
swing”. This is the case in experts (see Fig. 1) and during motor learning in the context
of increasing performance (Frank et al. 2013). In addition to the functional represen-
tation structure developing, a more appropriate temporal structure of the movement
evolves in the representation based on the temporal order of relevant body postures and
movement events. Altogether with increasing expertise, the representation of the
movement corresponds more and more to the topological (spatiotemporal) structure
of the movement itself. Within the course of learning and generating expertise there
seems to be an increasing overlap between the representation structure (clusters) and
the biomechanical structure of the movement (in terms of kinematics and functional
phases). The more differentiated and functionally valid the structure of representation,
the more appropriate are the anticipated and expected movement effects. Based on such
memory structures, athletes are better able to read and understand propriceptive,
auditive or visual information generated from the movement itself and indicating
ongoing movement effects. Accordingly, movement control becomes possible by
representing the anticipated perceptual (“simulated”) effects of the movement and
comparing them with incoming action produced (“real”) perceptual effects. From that
perspective, the balance between the expected and the incoming effects becomes the
basis for ongoing movement corrections and functional adaptations within the whole
action architecture.
5 Studies about Mental Representation in Skilled Action
Several studies in sport (e.g. Frank et al. 2013; Schack 2004a, b; Schack and Bar-Eli
2007; Schack and Hackfort 2007; Weigelt et al. 2009), dance (Bläsing et al. 2009;
Bläsing 2010), movement rehabilitation after stroke (Braun et al. 2007), music (Schack
2004b), walking (Stöckel et al. 2015) and cognitive robotics (Schack and Ritter 2009;
Schack and Ritter 2013) used the SDA-M-approach to measure the structure and
dimension of mental representation in motor action. Most of the studies in sport are
done to investigate the nature and role of mental representation in skilled athletic
performance, and to derive new technologies in mental training and technical prepara-
tion (Schack and Hackfort 2007; Schack and Bar-Eli 2007; Schack 2004a). Findings
from studies across sports, such as golf (Frank et al. 2013), soccer (Lex et al. 2015),
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tennis (Schack and Mechsner 2006), wind surfing (Schack and Hackfort 2007),
volleyball (Schack 2004b), climbing (Bläsing et al. 2014) and judo (Weigelt et al.
2011) show that the mental representation structures relate to performance. These
Fig. 2 Mean group dendrograms of the practice group (N = 12) for the golf putt at a pre-test and b retention-
test. The control group is not shown. The numbers on the x-axis relate to the BAC number, the numbers on the
y-axis display Euclidean distances. The lower the link between related BACs, the lower is the Euclidean
distance. The horizontal dotted line marks dcrit for a given α-level (dcrit = 3.41; α = .05): links between BACs
above this line are considered unrelated; horizontal grey lines on the bottom mark clusters. BACs: (1)
shoulders parallel to target line, (2) align club face square to target line, (3) grip check, (4) look to the hole,
(5) rotate shoulders away from the ball, (6) keep arms-shoulder triangle, (7) smooth transition, (8) rotate
shoulders towards the ball, (9) accelerate club, (10) impact with the ball, (11) club face square to target line at
impact, (12) follow-through, (13) rotate shoulders through the ball, (14) decelerate club, (15) direct clubhead
to planned position, and (16) look to the outcome. [Reprinted from Frank et al. (2013), with permission]
Fig. 3 Top panel: End-state comfort satisfaction (proportion of children) in the bar transport task for the
simple (white bars) and advanced planning condition (grey bars). Middle panel: The representational
structures for comfortable and uncomfortable grips for the 7-year old children, the 8-year old children and
the 9-year old children. Depicted are the averaged group data based on the SDA-M analysis. Bottom panel:
Images of the stimuli used in the SDA-M task. Pictures 1 to 6 depict comfortable grasp postures, and pictures
U1 to U3 depict uncomfortable grasp postures. [Reprinted from Stöckel et al. (2012), with permission
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representation structures are the outcome of an increasing and effort-reducing order
formation in LTM. In high-level experts, these representational frameworks were
organized in a distinctive hierarchical tree-like structure, remarkably similar among
individuals, and well matched onto the functional and biomechanical demands of the
task. In comparison, action representations in low-level players and non-players were
organized less hierarchically and more variably among individuals.
In addition to comparisons of representations across levels of expertise, a practical
implication from these measurements of mental representations in skilled performance
arises from the fact that these representation structures can also be analyzed on an
individual level. On the one hand, this provides the opportunity to gain knowledge
about an athlete’s specific movement problems (individualized diagnostics, e.g.
Weigelt et al. 2011), and on the other hand, it gives coaches a tool to provide
performance-related instructions and to optimize mental and technical training, which
goes (as an alternative) beyond the use of traditional methods such as non-standardized
questionnaires or observation methods from biomechanics (i.e. measurement of move-
ment kinematics).
Accordingly, the structure of cognitive representations in LTM is also relevant for
perception and visuomotor control in motor action. However, little is known about the
relationship of cognitive representations and visuomotor control for complex move-
ments. Therefore, in a recent study we investigated whether cognitive representations of
complex movements influence (unconscious) visual perception (Güldenpenning et al.
2011). Novices and skilled high-jump athletes were shown to differ in that only skilled
athletes seem to have a functionally structured, cognitive representation of the high
jump movement (Fosbury flop). Both groups were asked to classify pictures of body
postures of the high jump movement. In a so-called priming paradigm, each of these
picture presentations were preceded by another picture of a high jump body posture that
could not be perceived consciously. Participants had to classify whether the second
pictures in each trial showed a body posture from the approach or from the flight phase.
Importantly, the two pictures in each trial could differ with regard to the shown
movement phase but also in temporal order. That is, both pictures could reflect the
natural order within or between movement phases or, alternatively, they could be
presented in a reversed order (e.g., flight before approach). We found a main effect
of temporal order for skilled athletes, that is, faster reaction times for picture pairs that
reflected the natural movement order as opposed to the reversed movement order.
Novices showed a qualitatively different data pattern which was in line with superficial
processing of visual features unrelated to the high jump movement. These results
suggest that the structure of cognitive movement representations modulates the visual
processing of body postures. Temporal information seems to be an important dimen-
sion of such representations (cf. also Güldenpenning et al. 2013) and can be processed
automatically as the extraction of temporal order information requires unconscious
processing of (one of) the pictures.
To learn more about different types and formats of such motor representation we
studied the relationship between represented activities and the body schema (Bläsing
et al. 2010b). The body schema has been described as the multimodal representation of
the body that integrates somatosensory, proprioceptive, vestibular and visual informa-
tion. Therefore, we investigated the mental representation of body parts and related
activities in two individuals with congenitally absent limbs. One of the individuals was
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born without forearms and legs, and perceived phantoms of all four limbs, while the
other individual was born without hands and arms and has two shortened legs with only
one functionally intact foot, but has never experienced any phantom sensation. We
measured cognitive action and body representations of these two individuals and
compared their results to those of a group of paraplegic wheelchair athletes, and of a
group of individuals with physically intact limbs. Results of the group of physically
intact subjects and the group of paraplegic subjects reflected modularity of the body
schema (Haggard and Wolpert 2005), with separate clusters for the lower body, upper
body, fingers and head. The representation structure of the participant with congenital
phantom limbs more closely resembled the structure of the matched control group with
physically intact limbs, than the structure for the participant with congenitally absent
limbs but without phantoms. The results provide evidence for a strong interaction of
cognitive motor representation and cognitive body representations on a functional level.
It seems that body representation and cognitive integration of perceptual body infor-
mation are strongly influenced by cognitive motor representations (Bläsing et al.
2010b).
Based on these and other studies (e.g. Giummarra et al. 2007; Haggard and Wolpert
2005), we argue that major interfaces in the architecture of movement are cognitive in
nature (without fully denying the relevance of automated processes such as reflexes or
postural control of the whole body). Such a perspective does not view the motor system
as being distinct from cognition. Instead, it considers both conscious and automatized
processes of movement organization to be based functionally on mental representation
structures. This does not ignore the significance of emotional or motivational processes;
it simply puts them aside in order to focus on the cognitive architecture of movement
(Schack and Ritter 2009; Tenenbaum et al. 2009).
6 Mental Representation and Learning
Differences in the mental representation structure between novices, intermediates, and
experts (Schack and Mechsner 2006; Bläsing et al. 2009) suggest that the structure of
mental representations of complex movements changes alongside of improvements in
skill level. More specifically, the structure of the mental representation of a given
complex movement might develop towards the functional structure of an expert over
the course of practice. Therefore, a novice’s unstructured representation of a movement
is thought to develop into a more structured representation during motor learning.
Accordingly, we assume learning to be a product of modifying the mediating mental
representation structures in long term memory (see Schack and Ritter 2013).
To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few studies examining how mental
representation structures develop during practice (see for an overview Schack and Land
2016). As it seems crucial to learn more about whether and when changes in mental
representations occur and how they develop during learning, we examined structural
changes in mental representations of a complex movement during early skill acquisition
(Frank et al. 2013). The acquisition of the golf putting movement was investigated in a
group of novice golfers. After a three-day period of practice with the task, in the post-
test, the mental representation of the practice group was compared to that of a control
group. As expected, the mental representation structure showed functional changes
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(i.e., functional clusters in the group’s dendrogram) in the practice group along with
performance improvement while no such changes were observed in the control group.
Specifically, the mental representation structure of the practice group changed over the
course of practice and became more similar to an expert’s structure. As shown in Fig. 2,
the practice group’s mean dendrogram revealed an increased number of functional
clusters, with BACs being clustered into three functional units relating to distinct
movement phases (i.e., movement preparation, the forward swing, and the impact
phase). In contrast, no changes were evident in the mental representation structure of
the control group which did not practice at all between SDA-M measurements.
Similar to practicing by way of execution, mental representations have been found to
change functionally with mental types of practice such as imagery (Frank et al. 2014,
2016, 2018b; Simonsmeier et al. 2018) and observation (Frank et al. 2018a). From
these findings, mental practice seems to promote the cognitive adaptation process
during motor learning, leading to more elaborate representations. This suggests that
mental practice affects the perceptual-cognitive levels of action organization at an early
stage of motor learning and that way induces learning from within (Frank 2016; Frank
and Schack 2017).
These findings suggest that the functional development of mental representations
plays a significant role during motor learning, presumably, for the development of
movement expertise. Further investigations from a number of different activities (e.g.,
golf, soccer, wind surfing, volleyball, gymnastics, and dancing) also support the
functional relation between mental representation structures and performance and
expertise (Bläsing et al. 2009, 2010a; Land et al. 2013; Schack 2004a; Schack and
Hackfort 2007; Schack and Bar-Eli 2007; Velentzas et al. 2011).
7 Skilled Manual Action
In manual actions we find a most impressive integration of capabilities to shape
physical interaction, comprising all levels of action architecture ranging from sensori-
motor control to mental control and integrating all types of operations and representa-
tions. Today, highly developed anthropoids, humans, and robots are able to perform
manual actions. Manual actions allow for a particular object-related interaction and
represent cognitive operations (specifically, classifications). Based on grasping move-
ments, anthropoids can identify physically different objects as functionally equivalent
tools for solving typical behavioral problems (such manipulating a screw). As current
studies show, human grasping movements are cognitively represented on the basis of
movement concepts (e.g., Basic Action Concepts) and build on effect-oriented target
codes (in relation to space rather than to the body; Rosenbaum et al. 2007; Schack
2004a, b; Schack and Ritter 2009, 2013).
Hence, the perceptual-cognitive control of arm and hand movements has become a
topic of study in psychology, biomechanics, cognitive motion science, cognitive
robotics, and bio-cybernetics. To understand the biomechanical and cognitive back-
ground of manual action in more detail, we established lines of research on the
movement primitives of manual action, with the help of biomechanical and cognitive
analyses. Because the production of manual actions is affected by such factors as
biomechanical constraints (Rosenbaum et al. 2001; Weigelt et al. 2006), we have
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carried out some developmental studies on the relationship between biomechanical
constraints like the end-state-comfort effect and the cognitive representation of grasping
postures in children (Stöckel et al. 2012). Other studies have explored the link between
semantic and motor memory, especially in the case of grasping (Weigelt et al. 2009).
To strengthen links between experimental research and robotics, we have studied
cognitive representations not in isolation but as parts of a cognitive action architecture
(Maycock et al. 2010; Schack and Ritter 2009, 2013). Such a perspective has conse-
quences for the design of experimental studies and other lines of reseach. For instance,
until recently motor planning has been studied in situations where participants carry out
physical actions without a particular purpose or overarching movement goal. Yet, when
one examines everyday life, it is apparent that our physical interactions are normally
planned and executed with higher-order goals in mind. Therefore, we examined
whether two previously discovered motor planning phenomena – the end-state comfort
effect and motor hysteresis – would hold up when the actions were carried out in the
service of higher-order goals. As we claimed before, the end-state comfort effect is the
tendency to avoid awkward postures at the end of a movement (Rosenbaum et al. 1990,
2001). Motor hysteresis is the tendency of the motor system to reuse the former motor
plan and thus to persist in the former movement state. In binary tasks (e.g., Weigelt
et al. 2009), this results in switching from one state to another at different values (e.g.,
drawer heights) depending on the movement history (e.g., on sequence direction).
The higher-order goal we chose to study was memorization. In focusing on mem-
orization, we asked not only how motor planning is affected by the need to memorize,
but also how memory performance might depend on the cognitive demands of motor
planning. We asked students to retrieve cups from a column of drawers and memorize
as many letters as possible from the insides of the cups. The end-state comfort effect
and motor hysteresis were replicated in these conditions, indicating that the effects hold
up when physical actions are carried out for the sake of a higher-order goal. However,
one of the most reliable effects in memory research was eliminated, namely, recency
effect. Recent items were not recalled better than items encountered earlier. This
outcome was not an artifact of memory being uniformly poor, because the tendency
of initial items to be recalled better than items in the middle of the sequence – the
primacy effect – was obtained. The recency effect did not disappear because partici-
pants had to recall items in their correct order, for it was also eliminated when the items
could be recalled in any order. These and other aspects of our results support recent
claims for tighter links between basic mechanisms of perceptual-motor control and
cognitive (symbolic) processing (representation of verbal information) than have been
assumed in the past, with researchers mostly assuming seperate accounts for
perceptual-motor and verbal performance (for more information, see Weigelt et al.
2009). These results indicate a link between the increasing cognitive demands for
motor planning in the context of motor hysteresis (reuse of former motor plans) while
opening the drawers and the memorization of verbal letters. This conflict leads to
measurable effects at the end oft the task, where a switch of the grasp type is required.
This cognitive replanning impairs memory capacity and the recency effect gets lost.
The results support the idea that the interaction of cognitive and perceptual-motor
components in human action works at different levels and is part of an overall
architecture (e.g., Spiegel et al. 2012, 2013).
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Linking mental representation to motor planning in manual action, Weigelt and
Schack (2010) showed that the end-state comfort effect develops gradually with the
sensory-motor maturation of children. The children performed a dowel placing task,
reaching for a horizontal dowel and inserting one of its ends into a target disc. Although
all children, regardless of age, reached for the dowel with an overhand grasp when this
resulted in a comfortable end-state (i.e. thumb-up posture), a different pattern emerged
when an underhand grip had to be selected. In this latter situation, only 18% of the 3-
year-olds, 45% of the 4-year-olds, and 67% of the 5-year-olds used an underhand grip
and finished the action in a comfortable end-state. These results show a distinct pattern
of gradual improvement in children’s sensitivity to end-state comfort across the three
age-groups. Such information about basic principles of end-state comfort planning in
humans is of interest when designing valid robot architectures that are used to perform
manual actions and interact with human beings in an appropriate, age-dependent
manner (Gienger et al. 2008).
Stöckel et al. (2012) investigated anticipatory motor planning and the development
of mental representations of grasping postures in children aged 7, 8, and 9 years.
Overall, 9-year-old children were more likely than 7- or 8-year-olds to plan their
movements to end in comfortable postures, and to have distinct representational
structures for certain grasp postures. Additionally, sensitivity to comfortable end-
states was related to the mental representation of certain grasp postures. Children with
functionally well structured representations related to grasp comfort were more likely to
have satisfied end-state comfort in both the simple and the advanced planning condi-
tion. In contrast, children whose cognitive representations were not structured by grasp
comfort achieved far less satisfaction with grasp comfort in the advance planning
condition. Using the SDA-M method, no distinct clusters were found for comfortable
and uncomfortable grips in 7- and 8-year–olds (Fig. 3), indicating a limited cognitive
capacity to distinguish between awkward and comfortable postures. In contrast, the 9–
year-old children showed distinct clusters for comfortable and uncomfortable grips with
uncomfortable postures represented very close together in long-term memory and
representational structures near to an ideal categorization. The differences between
the 7- to 8- and the 9-year-old children proved to be significant. Hence, the represen-
tational structures indicate that only the 9-year-old children represented the differences
between comfortable and uncomfortable grasping postures efficiently in memory.
The results of this study support the notion that cognitive action representation plays
an important role in the planning and control of grasp postures. Furthermore it shows
that dexterity in manual action and task related object manipulation is accompanied by
order formation in memory. Such order formation in action knowledge reduces the
cognitive effort required to activate relevant information. From this perspective, we
have to solve movement tasks purposefully and in a step by step fashion within the
framework of voluntary organization of movement. Hence, we assume that advanced
anticipatory motor planning requires a well-established cognitive representation of the
respective task with its constraints and a variety of possible solutions (e.g., hand
postures). Advanced anticipatory motor planning (as evidenced by the end-state com-
fort effect) seems to depend strongly on children’s hands-on experiences, which are
necessary to establish efficient cognitive representation structures in long-term memory
(Fig. 4).
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From a broader perspective concerning skilled manual actions the development and
the usage of technologies is associated with changes in the profile and spectrum of
basic human action skills (Suelzenbrueck et al. 2011). Suelzenbrueck and colleagues
(Suelzenbrueck et al. 2011) investigated such effects in the context of handwriting. To
learn more about skilled action control in manual action we started to investigate the
history, development and representation of former (recently lost) Basic Action Skills,
like different types of skilled actions in forging, tool making and traditional survival
skills (like bow drill fire making). Interestingly, early human beings were not only able
to apply tool, they could also produce them for specific purposes. This led to new
framing conditions for the further development of the species and for individual
survival. The oldest known stone tools come from the Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania
and are about 2 million years old. The production of such tools meant that not only the
goal but also a chain of action steps and related operations had to be stored in memory
(Klix 1993; Klix and Lanius 1999). It had to be possible to compare the goal with the
sensory and functionally detectable effects of the tool produced. This led knowledge to
acquire a new kind of functionality in skilled action.
In the context of evolutionary tool making it has been possible to confirm the
formation of cognitive concepts in manual action (Rensch 1973). By reconstructing
the tools and products of former cultures it is possible, from our perspective, to study
and understand the involved cognitive, perceptual and motor related operations and the
architecture and representation of skilled actions in more detail. This may help to
understand and reflect the technology and culture dependent changes in the spectrum of
Basic Motor Skills and the consequences for the development of perceptual-cognitive
skills and skilled action.
The specific methods presented in this paper make it possible to take essential
information regarding the underlying cognitive-perceptual action system into account,
while still addressing the individual needs of an athlete, dancer or a scholar in different
Fig. 4 The evolution of survival tools. From a 800,000-year-old biface (left) to a recent multilayer damast
steel knife with a mammoth molar grip - handmade by the first author (right). Photograph: Gregor Panic
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types of manual or sport action in a better way. Furthermore, the theoretical perspective
on the cognitive architecture of action developed here, and the accompanying methods
(technological steps) are not just relevant for optimizing the daily work of the sport
psychologist or dance coach, but are also useful in opening up new perspectives to
modify classical approaches of technical preparation and mental training in sport and
rehabilitation.
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